Recent stuff on Flopping Aces
Partial List of Thwarted Al Queda Attacks
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Nancy Pelosi was an accomplice to ‘torture.’
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Obama Decides Against Releasing Detainee Photos - Video
Obama Backs Down on Release of Detainee “Abuse” Photos
Pelosi About To Be Investigated Over The Interrogation Methods Used On Those Responsible For 9/11
Outstanding comments by Mataharley comment #30:
Volume 1 examines the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global context. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in Volume 1. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.
I’ll post few excerpts that should catch your interest. But I suggest a full read of all of Vol 1, and consult the translated exhibits in the remaining volumes as you desire. These are based on the Harmony and ISG documents of the Saddam regime archives captured in 2003, but took years to get even these few translated. There are still volumes and hundreds of thousands of documents still not translated and released to the public.
What you will need to remember is that al Zawahiri was, from 1993 and on, the grand pooo-bah of EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) prior before he merged that group with Bin Laden’s AQ a few years later. Zawahiri’s relationship with OBL did not magically begin with the 2001 merger.
Two other memoranda in this folder are from Saddam through his Presidential Secretary to a member of the Revolutionary Council and to the IIS Director, respectively.
• In the first, from January 1993, and coinciding with the start of the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the Presidential Secretary informed the council member of Saddam’s decision to “form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia.”
Let’s see…. Saddam’s regime decided to form a group to hunt Americans in Somalia in 1993… which you may remember as Black Hawk Down. From the Lawrence Wright series of articles I linked above in the 2001 merger sentence: Also found in the New Yorker
In June of 2001, two terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, formally merged into one. The name of the new entity—Qaeda al-Jihad—reflects the long and interdependent history of these two groups. Although Osama bin Laden, the founder of Al Qaeda, has become the public face of Islamic terrorism, the members of Islamic Jihad and its guiding figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have provided the backbone of the larger organization’s leadership. According to officials in the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., Zawahiri has been responsible for much of the planning of the terrorist operations against the United States, from the assault on American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, and the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998 and of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th.
And just who was it that did the training of the Somalia troops that assaulted our US troops in Somalia? Bin Laden.
Let’s see… Saddam uses Zawahiri and other jihad/AQ related groups for more than a decade before OIF (that’s at least 1993, and when Zawahiri was the head of EIJ), and the Saddam regime forms group to “hunt Americans” in Somalia in 1993. Zawahiri has been responsible for the assault on the Black Hawk down soldiers, and Bin Laden trains the troops that murder our troops.
What could be the connection?
A. Managing Relationships
Iraq was a long-standing supporter of international terrorism. The existence of a memorandum (Extract 10) from the lIS to Saddam, written a decade before OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, provides detailed evidence of that support. Several of the organizations listed in this memorandum were designated as international terrorist organizations by the US Department of State.
[Mata Musing: the "list" includes many named jihad groups, but the excerpts from Extract 10 pertinent is:]
We list herein the organizations that our agency [IIS] cooperates with and have relations with various elements in many parts of the Arab world and who also have the expertise to carry out assignments indicated in the above directive [the cited directive has not been discovered yet].
Islamic Jihad Organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad]
In a meeting in the Sudan we agreed to renew our relations with the Islamic Jihad Organization in Egypt. Our information on the group is as follows: It was established in 1979.
Its goal is to apply the Islamic shari’ a law and establish Islamic rule. It is considered one of the most brutal Egyptian organizations. It carried out numerous successful operations, including the assassination of Sadat.
We have previously met with the organization’s representative and we agreed on a plan to carry out commando operations against the Egyptian regime.
Nurturing Organizational Relationships
Captured Iraqi archives reveal that Saddam was training Arab fighters (non-Iraqi) in Iraqi training camps more than a decade prior to OPERATION DESERT STORM (1991). A Saddam memorandum directed the IIS to submit a list of foreign nationals who were trained in Iraq and carried out operations during the 1991 war against the United States. 33 In response, the IIS sent a list of one-hundred names of foreign national fighters, categorized by country (Extract 11, next page).
When attacking Western interests, the competitive terror cartel came into play, particularly in the late 1990s. Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda-as long as that organization’s near-term goals supported Saddam’s longterm vision. A directive (Extract 24) from the Director for International Intelligence in the IIS to an Iraqi operative in Bahrain orders him to investigate a particular terrorist group there, The Army of Muhammad.
The agent reports (Extract 25) that The Army of Muhammad is
working with Osama bin Laden.
The Saddam regime was very concerned about the internal threat posed by various Islamist movements. Crackdowns, arrests, and monitoring of Islamic radical movements were common in Iraq. However, Saddam’s security organizations and bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims, at least for the short tenn. Considerable operational overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the regional groups involved in
terrorism. Saddam provided training and motivation to revolutionary pan-Arab nationalists in the region. Osama bin Laden provided training and motivation for violent revolutionary Islamists in the region. They were recruiting within the same demographic, spouting much the same rhetoric, and promoting a common historical narrative that promised a return to a glorious past. That these movements (panArab and pan-Islamic) had many similarities and strategic parallels does not mean they saw themselves in that light. Nevertheless, these similarities created more than just the appearance of cooperation. Common interests, even without common cause, increased the aggregate terror threat.
Saddam’s interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign “fighters” drawn from these diverse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives. 97
Saddam’s “business model” also included using terrorist events to his advantage even when he had no direct connection to them. One example is an audio file of a meeting between Saddam and his senior advisors recorded sometime in 1994. The subject was the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center in ew York; Iraq now had a suspect in custody, Abdul Rahman Yasin. 101
Saddam discusses the possibility that the attack was part of the “dirty games that the American intelligence would play if it had a bigger purpose.” 102 The participants in this meeting discuss other possible explanations, including direct or indirect involvement of either Israel or various factions in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. These alternative theories resonate with Saddam; he doubts that Abdul Rahman Yasin, convicted of being the ringleader, is capable of such an operation.
In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam’s ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam’s “coercion” toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1) his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2) the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and “outreach programs” for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.
Read the reports and the translated documents, and recognize this is only a small piece of the puzzle that still has yet to be revealed… providing this admin or any future admin puts resources towards this segment of history.
But what we have undeniable knowledge is that Saddam’s relationship with AQ affiliated jihad movements goes back long before OIF, and that his declared intents to “hunt Americans” in 1993 happens to coincide with Americans hunted by those who were connected to both Zawahiri and Bin Laden.
You may think only AQ is the enemy. But the more you read, the more you will understand the tenacled and complex relationships to different jihad groups, and their relationship to regimes such as Saddam’s as an unofficial state weapon.
and Scott comment #31:
Ryan, I sent you the Excel spreadsheet I have which has the links/sources for the following, but…this is what I’ve got for 1993. Hope this helps. If anyone else wants my timeline (1974-2005), lemme know.
1/1/93 Evidence of Iraq’s involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States may have been available long before 9-11. Ramsi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center attack in the parking garage, first came to America on an Iraqi passport. Phone records showed calls by Yousef to Baghdad.
1/1/93 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM to use its own aircraft in Iraq. Iraq begins incursions into the de-militarised zone with Kuwait, and increases its military activity in the no-fly zones. The U.N. Security Council states that Iraq’s actions were an “unacceptable and material” breach of Resolution 687 and warns Iraq of “serious consequences.” Shortly thereafter, the United States, UK, and France launch air raids on southern Iraq.
circa 1/1/93 Sometime in early 1993, Bin Laden sent Mohammed Atef to Mogadishu, Somalia to train people how to bring down helicopters with RPG’s as was done by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan when they fought the Soviets.
circa 1/1/93 [throughout the 1990's] Bin Laden met at least eight times with officers of Iraq’s Special Security Organization, a secret police agency run by Saddam’s son Qusay, and met with officials from Saddam’s mukhabarat, its external intelligence service, according to intelligence made public by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was speaking before the United Nations Security Council on February 6, 2003.
1/1/93 References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained that Iraqi support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the aftermath of 9-11.
circa 1/1/93 1993—al-Qaeda acquires a private plane and sends a pilot to Airman Flight School in Oklahoma in the first instance of Osama bin Laden’s interest in aviation. Link
circa 1/1/93 1993— MOUSSAOUI starts to attend classes at a London trade school, South Bank University.
circa 1/1/93 Osama bin Laden had dealings with Iraqi Intelligence as early as 1993 in Somalia. During that period, various militant Islamic groups, to include bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence and military operatives, were in Somalia to organize, train and mobilize radical factions within the Somali populace. (NOTE: Bin Laden claimed this, and it wasn’t until late in the Clinton Administration that it was proven. Mohammed Atef-then AQ’s military commander and #3 man-went to Somalia and trained warlords in the techniques developed in Afghanistan for bringing down helicopters with RPG’s. The result was in fact that the now infamous Black Hawk Down battle came from Somalis trained by Al Queda…exactly as Bin Laden claimed.)
1/1/93 War in Bosnia continues, as “ethnic cleansing” spreads. NATO threatens airstrikes to defend “safe areas” created to protect Muslims.
circa 1/1/93 A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.
circa 1/1/93 We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.
circa 1/1/93 Egypt and Sudan at loggerheads over territorial rights to Halaib, prompted by Sudan granting oil exploration concession. Each accuses the other of harbouring opposition elements.
circa 1/1/93 Iraqi MiG-23 aircraft that fled to Iran in the Gulf War have allegedly been refitted by Iran for use by the Sudanese air force against the SPLA in South Sudan. Lt-Gen Abdel Rahman Said, former army deputy chief of staff and now leading the Sudanese opposition Armed Forces Legitimate Command, says Baghdad was a party to the deal, and that the MiGs - ‘the only type of Iraqi plane that Sudan can maintain’ would go back to Iraq after an unspecified period. He claims Iran has delivered “between 60 and 90 tanks” to Khartoum, as well as long-range howitzers, ammunition and lorries.
1/1/93 In 1993, Iraq sent additional chemical weapons to Sudan, this time through Iran.
1/1/93 *”American intelligence believes that Al Qaeda and Saddam reached a non-aggression agreement in 1993, and that the relationship deepened further in the mid-nineteen-nineties, when an Al Qaeda operative - a native-born Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi - was dispatched by bin Laden to ask the Iraqis for help in poison-gas training. Al-Iraqi’s mission was successful, and an unknown number of trainers from an Iraqi secret-police organization called Unit 999 were dispatched to camps in Afghanistan to instruct Al Qaeda terrorists. (Training in hijacking techniques was also provided to foreign Islamist radicals inside Iraq, according to two Iraqi defectors quoted in a report in the Times in November of 2001.)” The parenthetic reference to a November 2001 NY Times article, which describes the Salman Pak terrorist training camp outside Baghdad, is notable. A ruling by a Federal Court against the Iraqi regime on behalf of two families of those who died on September 11, 2001 was based partially on that training.
circa 1/1/93 In 1993, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) directed and pursued an attempt to assassinate, through the use of a powerful car bomb, former U.S. President George Bush and the Emir of Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities thwarted the terrorist plot and arrested 16 suspects, led by two Iraqi nationals.
circa 1/1/93 American intelligence believes that Al Qaeda and Saddam reached a non-aggression agreement in 1993, and that the relationship deepened further in the mid-nineteen-nineties, when an Al Qaeda operative - a native-born Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi - was dispatched by bin Laden to ask the Iraqis for help in poison-gas training. Al-Iraqi’s mission was successful, and an unknown number of trainers from an Iraqi secret-police organization called Unit 999 were dispatched to camps in Afghanistan to instruct Al Qaeda terrorists. (Training in hijacking techniques was also provided to foreign Islamist radicals inside Iraq, according to two Iraqi defectors quoted in a report in the Times in November of 2001.) The parenthetic reference to a November 2001 NY Times article, which describes the Salman Pak terrorist training camp outside Baghdad, is notable. A ruling by a Federal Court against the Iraqi regime on behalf of two families of those who died on September 11, 2001 was based partially on that training.”
1/8/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi restrictions of UN aircraft a material breach of RES 687
1/10/93 Iraq removes equipment from the Kuwaiti side of DMZ
1/11/93 UNSC presidential statement condemns Iraq for material breach of RES 687 in preventing UNSCOM from flying its own aircraft
1/13/93 US, UK, France conduct air raids on Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites and radar bases in southern Iraq
1/17/93 US fires missiles at industrial complex in suburban Baghdad
1/18/93 US and UK launch air raids against radar sites in southern and northern Iraq
1/19/93 Iraq agrees to allow UNSCOM flights in Iraq.
1/21/93 An F-16 and an F-4G escorting a French Mirage reconnaissance plane over northern Iraq attack an Iraqi missile battery after the site’s search radar began tracking them.
1/22/93 An F-4G fires two missiles at a surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site in northern Iraq.
2/1/93 February 1993 Yazdi, Turabi, and Bashir present their plans to Iranian terror experts in a meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. The Iranians approve, and the attacks are ordered to proceed.
2/3/93 Iraqi gunners fire at a U.S. aircraft on routine patrol over northern Iraq.
2/5/93 UNSC adopts RES 806 allowing UNIKOM to take direct action to prevent or redress violations in DMZ
2/26/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Ramsi Yousef (aka “Rashid the Iraqi”) flees the United States to Pakistan on a fake Pakistani passport with the name Abdul Basit (A Kuwaiti missing since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)
2/26/93 World Trade Center bombed by Al Queda
2/26/93 The Iraqis, who had the Third World’s largest poison-gas operations prior to the Gulf War I, have perfected the technique of making hydrogen-cyanide gas, which the Nazis called Zyklon-B. In the hands of al Qaeda, this would be a fearsome weapon in an enclosed space — like a suburban mall or subway station-this same form of cyanide was found in the 1993 WTC attack residue and in the seized bomb-making storage unit. It was also found in the Euphrates River by advancing US Marines South of Baghdad in 2003
3/1/93 Spring 1993 Mohammed Farah Aidid meets with Iraqi intelligence officials in the Iraqi embassy. Baghdad promises to aid him in his fight against the Americans with the explicit intent of turning Somalia into another Vietnam for the Americans.
3/1/93 Spring 1993 Saddam Hussein viewed the operations against the Americans in Somalia important enough to nominate his son Qusay to personally supervise them. The other elements of anti-American operations apparently didn’t support this idea. Those other elements included Bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs, the Iranian-backed Al Quds forces, the Iranian Pasadran, and the Sudanese. Iraqi intelligence reported that Saddam wanted a “Mother-of-all Battles victory in Somalia.” After these reports and after Qusay’s nomination, the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan was expanded by the addition of several different Iraqi special intelligence services branches and special security branches. Those new additions were under the control of Sudan’s leader Hasan al-Turabi.
3/4/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Salameh is arrested for his part in the WTC bombing
3/5/93 [1993 World Trade Center bomber ] Abdul Rahman Yasin flees the United States for Iraq where he lives peacefully until his CBS interview years later.
3/31/93 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 816 authorising enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and extending the ban to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft except those authorised by UNPROFOR. In the event of further violations, it authorised UN member states to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance. An enforcement operation, called “Deny Flight”, began on 12 April 1993. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and supporting aircraft.
circa 4/1/93 Kuwaiti Intelligence discovers an Iraqi IIS plot to assassinate former President George Bush. [Author's note: in keeping with the tactic of a state-sponsor of terrorism, the attack was to have been carried out by terrorists not IIS operatives.]
4/9/93 Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery sites fire on Provide Comfort aircraft near the Saddam dam in northern Iraq.
4/14/1993 “Failed Iraqi plot to assassinate Bush family in Kuwait; In fact, if the intelligence George W. was given was correct, he might have lost nearly his entire immediate family, including his father, mother, wife, and two brothers. Just as he sought to avenge his father’s political loss, he would one day go after the man accused of attempting to murder his father and the rest of the family. “”After all,”" he would later comment, when speaking of the Iraqi leader at a Houston fundraiser, “”this is the guy who tried to kill my dad.”"
…As the giant plane took off from Houston’s Ellington Field on April 14, the only passengers were former President Bush, his wife Barbara, their two sons Marvin and Neil, his wife Sharon, and Laura Bush. Her husband, George W. Bush, who had always avoided foreign travel, stayed home to oversee his interest in the Texas Rangers baseball team and to make preparations for his run for the governorship.”
4/18/93 An Iraqi radar site illuminates two U.S. F-4Gs flying north of the 36th parallel. The site was south of the parallel. One of the aircraft fires an AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile at the tracking radar and destroyed it.
5/27/93 UNSC adopts RES 833 reaffirming Kuwaiti border issues in RES 733; guarantees inviolability of border
circa 6/1/93 In June 1993, NATO Foreign Ministers decided to offer protective air power for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its overall mandate. In July, NATO aircraft began flying training missions for providing such Close Air Support (CAS).
6/4/93 The U.S. conducts air strikes against Iraqi intelligence service, in retaliation for evidence linking the Iraqi government to the assassination plot against former president George Bush.
6/4/93 24 Pakistani Peacekeepers in Somalia are ambushed, shot to death, skinned, and their remains paraded through the streets by a mob. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that an Al Queda operative based in The Sudan, and several other Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]
6/10/93 Iraq refuses to allow emplacement of UN monitoring cameras at weapons facilities
6/18/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraq’s refusal of cameras material breach of RES 687, warns of serious consequences
6/24/93 A wave of arrests in NYC prevents a followup attack to the 1993 WTC attack. The relationships of the conspirators in both attacks are completely intertwined. The second attack was to focus on the UN headquarters, tunnels, and bridges in NYC.
6/27/93 U.S. missile strike is launched against Baghdad on basis of “compelling evidence” that Iraq was involved in the April 1993 assassination attempt on former President Bush in Kuwait.
6/27/93 US launches cruise missile at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for assassination plot against former President Bush [a plot that had been discovered 3-4 months earlier] [Author's note: while Clinton Administration officials deny that the retaliation strike was tied to the 6/24 wave of arrests in NYC or the 1993 WTC attack, the retaliation strike was the only US attack ever conducted against Iraq with so little warning and military preparation. It was also the only attack to be conducted completely unilaterally (without even the support of the UK), and it was the fdirst attack to draw massive international condemnation despite the claim that it was in retaliation for a terrorist attack that would often be deemed an act of war.]
6/28/93 UNSC presidential statement criticizes Iraqi statements on boundary demarcation
6/29/93 A Southern Watch F-4G fires an anti-radar missile at an anti-aircraft artillery site after the Iraqis illuminated it and another F-4G patrolling the southern no-fly zone.
7/1/93 A lengthy stand-off takes place between the Iraqi government and U.N. inspectors over Iraq’s refusal to allow inspectors to monitor two missile test sites south of Baghdad. U.N. monitors are withdrawn.
7/19/93 Iraq agrees to emplacement of monitoring cameras following Rolf Ekeus visit to Baghdad
7/29/93 In separate incidents, two U.S. Navy EA-6Bs, part of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, fire anti-radar missiles at Iraqi SAM sites after being illuminated by the sites’ surveillance radars.
circa 8/1/93 8/93 Unsuccessful attampt by the Al-Jihad organization to assassinate Interior Minister Hassan al Alfi of Egypt.
8/4/93 Abdul Rahman is indicted for his part in the 1993 WTC bombing.
8/8/93 A U.S. HUMMV hits a land mine in a pothole in Somalia. The mine was remote detonated. 4 American MP’s were killed. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that an Al Queda operative based in The Sudan, and several other Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]
8/19/93 Two U.S. F-16s report possible SA-3 missile launches west of Mosul and respond with cluster bombs. Two F-15s drop four laser-guided bombs on the site an hour later.
8/22/93 A bomb explodes near a U.S. Army HUMMV destroying the vehicle and seriously wounding 6 American soldiers. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]
9/1/93 Fall 1993 Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri is in Somalia acting as field commander of the “Afghan Arabs” and coordinator between those fighters, Iraqi fighters, Iranian intelligence, and the various Somali warlords….all against the US/UN forces.
9/1/93 [Fall 1993] “The Iraqis organized the heavy weapons, mainly the dual-use 23mm guns and RPG-7s, which were used primarily against the U.S. helicopters. The Iraqis were also instrumental in running the external perimeter, blocking repeated U.S.-U.N. attempts to relieve the beseiged force in the defensive perimeter. The Arab “Afghans” were in command of some of the Somali blocking forces as well. Reports conflict as to the extent of Iraqi participation in the actual fighting. A few [Iraqi] Saiqah Commando troops were definately present, giving instructions to [Somali] SIUP fighters.”
9/1/93 By the Fall of 1993, a large number of Iraqis moved into the area of the Red Sea mountain range — in Madabay in Khawr Ashraf, Port Sudan, in the region of Dalawat on the Red Sea near Hala’ib, and the city of Tawker in region of Karnakanat. The Iraqis brought into these installations high-tech equipment and computers, missiles, defense systems, anti-aircraft systems and radar systems.
9/14/93 Major General Thomas Montegomery in Somalia asks for reinforcements to create an emergency rapid reaction force in Mogadishu. The request is scaled down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but approved.
9/23/93 Sec.Def. Les Aspin vetos the request for heavy armor to be sent to Mogadishu
9/25/93 An American UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter is shot down in Mogadishu, Somalia. The crew is rescued. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]
circa 10/1/93 After the 8/22 bombing of a U.S. Army HUMMV, U.S. Army Task Force Ranger and Delta Force commandos make 6 raids trying to kill/capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. All fail publicly. [Author's note: in 1994/95 it is revealed by the Sudanese govt that Al Queda operatives including #3 man Mohammed Atef, had gone to Somalia, trained Somalis in tactics that had been learned during the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan, and had they themselves taken part in this attack.]
circa 10/1/93 Sudan is added to the U.S. State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism. [Author's note: this occurs at the same time as Sudanese intelligence officials were notifying the US of Al Queda terrorists based in Sudan and operating freely in Somalia against US forces. While there is no direct and/or public response toward Al Queda, the Sudan suffers publicly and economically as a supporter of international terrorism]
10/3/93 U.S. Task Force Ranger makes another daring daylight raid using the same tactics as the 6 earlier raids. This raid captures 22 leaders in Aidid’s organization. During the raid, a U.S. Army ranger falls from a hovering helicopter-halting the operation. While the operation is halted, two Blackhawk helicopters are shot down by Somalis with RPG’s. 18 Americans are killed. Eighty-four Americans are wounded. Two American Delta Force snipers volunteered to protect one of the downed helicopter crews until reinforcements could arrive. They were eventually overwhelmed by thousands of Somalis and killed. Their bodies mutilated and dragged through the streets. Shocking video from a French camera crew is shown around the world within hours of the debacle. One of the pilots protected by the Delta Force snipers is captured. Both Delta snipers received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Somali casualties will never be determined as the nation was in a complete state of anarchy. However, Red Crescent reports state that as many as 3000 were killed and somewhere between 5000 and 10,000 were wounded.
circa 10/3/93 “On 3 and 4 October, 1993, operatives of Al Queda particpated in the attack on U.S. military personnell serving in Somalia.”
10/20/93 President Clinton announces the withdrawl of all US troops from Somalia by 3/31/94
circa 11/1/93 11/93 - Unsuccessful attampt by the Al-Jihad organization to assassinate Prime Minister Atef Sedky of Egypt.
11/1/1993 Chalabi presents Clinton administration with war plan entitled “The End Game”
11/1/1993 In November of 1993, Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group devoted to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, presented the Clinton Administration with a detailed, four-phase war plan entitled “The End Game,” along with an urgent plea for money to finance it. “The time for the plan is now,” Chalabi wrote. “Iraq is on the verge of spontaneous combustion. It only needs a trigger to set off a chain of events that will lead to the overthrow of Saddam.” It was a message that Chalabi would repeat for the next eight years.
11/10/93 11/10/1993 John Kerry voted to cut intel spending
11/12/93 The New York Times reports that the Iraqi government forces have stepped up military pressure against Shiite villages in southern Iraq forcing thousands to flee deeper into the marshes or across the border into Iran.
11/16/93 Iraqi demonstrators cross into Kuwaiti territory protesting border demarcation
11/23/93 UNSC presidential statement terms Iraqi border violations breach of RES 687
11/26/93 Iraq accepts UN Security Council Resolution 715.
11/26/93 Iraq accepts RES 715
12/1/93 By late 1993, the regions surrounding these installations were experiencing strict security measures and 24-hour armed patrols roam around it. In some areas, such as in the Port Sudan area, shepherds and nomads were completely removed from security zones with a 60 km circumference.
12/21/93 Iraqi troops fire on a U.S. patrol near Faydah in northern Iraq. The patrol is within the security zone established on May 22, 1991. The Iraqis were over a mile away and outside the security zone. Baghdad denies Western reports of the incident as “fabricated and baseless.”
12/31/93 While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by- products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late 1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the June 1993 narrowly averted an attempt on the life of former President Bush by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term strategy to endure the global pressure.